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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR 
REHEARING (ON CLAIMS OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL) 
Case No. 021027 
Priority No. 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant was convicted of one count of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital felony; one 
count of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Attempted Murder in the First 
Degree, a first degree felony; one count of Aggravated Kidnapping, a 
first degree felony; one count of Escape, a second degree felony; 
and one count of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by an Incarcerated 
Person, a second degree felony, and directly appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court. Trial counsel continued to represent Appellant on 
appeal. After counsel filed Appellant's opening brief, Appellant 
filed a handwritten supplemental brief alleging that ineffective 
assistance of counsel occurred at trial. The Utah Supreme Court 
appointed alternate counsel to review the record and represent 
Appellant solely on the claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. On January 31, 1989, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
Appellant's convictions and the judgment imposed, including the 
sentence of death. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
After Appellant's counsel filed the opening brief in this 
case, Appellant filed a handwritten supplemental brief alleging 
ineffective assistance at trial. Counsel appointed to represent 
Appellant on the ineffectiveness claim filed a supplemental brief 
wherein he argued that review of this claim by the Court was 
premature since no evidentiary hearing had been held. 
An evidentiary hearing on the claims has not been held, 
and the substantive issue of whether ineffective assistance of 
counsel occurred at trial has not been briefed for this Court. 
On January 31, 1989, this Court issued its decision. It 
concluded that ineffective assistance of counsel did not occur in 
three alleged areas: the testimony of Officer Jorgensen, the 
testimony of Dr. Heinbecker, and the testimony of Mr. Fuches. The 
Court reasoned that Mr. Gardner was not prejudiced by the testimony 
of any of the three individuals. 
In so deciding, this Court misapplied the law, 
misconstrued the facts, and compounded Mr. Gardner's claims that he 
did not receive effective assistance of counsel. 
SOMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court prematurely decided this issue since an 




This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. In Brown v, Prickard, denying 
reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions. . . . 
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913), 
this Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter 
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in 
proper cases. When this court, however, has 
considered and decided all of the material 
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should 
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have 
either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result. . . . If there 
are some reasons, however, such as we have 
indicated above, or other good reasons, a petition 
for a rehearing should be promptly filed and, if 
it is meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
The argument section of this brief will establish that 
this Petition for Rehearing is properly before the Court. In its 
opinion in State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 1, 12-13 
(January 31, 1989) (relevant portions attached as Addendum A), this 
Court incorrectly and prematurely concluded that ineffective 
assistance of counsel did not occur in this case. 
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POINT: MR, GARDNER'S CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WERE DECIDED PREMATURELY BY 
THIS COURT, 
In reaching its decision that Mr. Gardner was not denied 
effective assistance of counsel as the result of trial counsel's 
failure to object to the testimony of Officer Jorgensen and his 
calling Dr. Heinbecker and Mr. Fuches, a member of the Board of 
Pardons, to testify for the defense during the penalty phase, this 
Court misconstrues the facts of this case, the presentation of the 
argument, and the applicable law. 
Mr. Gardner raised these three claims, among others, in a 
handwritten motion filed with the Court after counsel filed the 
opening brief in this case. The record does not establish that 
Mr. Gardner received a high school diploma and shows that 
Mr. Gardner missed large periods of school (R. 2756). Despite his 
lack of formal education or legal training, he was able to submit a 
legal document which cited statutes and case law and which informed 
this Court as to some of his concerns regarding his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. He requested that counsel assist 
him in raising these issues. 
Because trial counsel continued to represent Mr. Gardner 
on direct appeal and could not therefore adequately represent him on 
his ineffective assistance claims, this Court appointed alternate 
counsel to review those claims and to submit a brief regarding those 
claims, if appropriate. Counsel responded that the claims were 
premature. In other words, the claims needed to be investigated and 
a hearing held to supplement the record as to counsel's reasons for 
- 4 -
eliciting or not objecting to the various testimonies as well as 
other factors. 
No lawyer has briefed these claims of ineffective 
assistance for the Court and no hearing on the issues has ever been 
held. Despite this Court's conscientiousness in reviewing the 
record, the impact of a zealous advocate in raising and briefing the 
issues cannot be underestimated. At the root of our criminal 
justice system is the notion that criminal defendants have a right 
to have counsel present their defense at trial and to raise their 
arguments on appeal. Since a lawyer has not presented this argument 
to the Court, it is premature for this Court to discard the argument 
by the wave of a hand with the "no prejudice" label. In so doing, 
this Court compounds Mr. Gardner's claims that he did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Furthermore, this Court's summary conclusion that no 
prejudice attached to Mr. Gardner as the result of the three alleged 
deficiencies misconstrues the record in this case. 
First, this Court concludes that even if a Miranda or 
sixth amendment violation would have prevented Officer Jorgensen 
from testifying, "the evidence was still admissible for the purpose 
for which it was offered; therefore, no prejudice resulted from the 
lack of an objection to this point." 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12. On 
the contrary, because no instruction was given limiting the use of 
the testimony for credibility, the testimony was admitted for 
substantive purposes. Defense counsel argued the substance of the 
officer's testimony to the jury (R. 2557), seemingly unaware that it 
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was not admissible for that purpose. The prosecutor also argued the 
substance of Jorgensen's testimony and pointed out that it had been 
corroborated by other evidence (R. 2587). Absent a limiting 
instruction, the jury nevertheless was left with the impression that 
they could consider the testimony for substance and not just for 
determining Mr. Gardner's credibility. 
In addition, in reaching its decision that the failure to 
give an instruction limiting the use which could be made of 
Mr. Gardnerfs testimony was not manifest error, this Court states 
several times that defense counsel did not object to the testimony 
or request a limiting instruction. 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. This 
reasoning, when read in conjunction with the ineffective assistance 
analysis, seems to leave Mr. Gardner in a remedyless middle ground. 
According to the Court, there is no error regarding Officer 
Jorgensen's testimony because counsel did not make a record, but the 
failure to raise the issues does not amount to ineffective 
assistance because Mr. Gardner was not prejudiced. This is simply 
not the case. 
Furthermore, by not making a motion to suppress and by 
seemingly not understanding that the testimony was suppressible but 
could be used for credibility purposes if Mr. Gardner were to 
testify, defense counsel was unable to adequately prepare his case 
and offer adequate advice to Mr. Gardner as to whether to testify. 
The testimony of Officer Jorgensen was devastating to the 
defense. Defense counsel called it the single most damaging piece 
of evidence (R. 2557). In this case where defendant maintained that 
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he did not intend to shoot Mr, Burdell, his alleged statements to 
Officer Jorgensen when considered for substantive purposes, as the 
jury surely did, erased any doubt. 
The issue of whether Mr. Gardner was prejudiced by 
counsel's deficient performance in dealing with the Jorgensen issue 
is larger than this Court acknowledges and requires that an 
evidentiary hearing be held to supplement the record and that the 
issue be adequately briefed. It is prematurely before this Court 
and should not be so easily dismissed. 
Dr. Heinbecker's testimony was also devastating to the 
defense. He labeled Mr. Gardner as an anti-social personality, 
which conjures negative images for the jury. Such a label is 
generally attached to a defendant by the State as an aggravating 
circumstance, not offered by defendant as mitigation. Furthermore, 
Dr. Heinbecker gave the jury little hope that Mr. Gardner would 
"reform" when he testified "it is a personality development whereby 
people act in these criminal fashions and their personality is 
formed and remains that way, generally, for the rest of their lives" 
(R. 2799). He further testified that it is "relatively unusual" for 
a person who has had a "bad life" to "turn around as an adult" 
(R. 2802) and that Ronnie felt very little guilt and was easily able 
to overcome any guilt he might feel (R. 2803). This suggestion of 
future dangerousness, lack of remorse, and inability to change is 
generally evidence the prosecution attempts to introduce in the 
penalty phase. 
The record clearly indicates that Dr. Heinbecker had only 
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twenty-four hours to prepare (R. 2794, 7812, 7815). Defense counsel 
therefore had little time to review what Dr. Heinbecker was going to 
say and ascertain the benefit, if any, of his testimony. The State 
argued Dr. Heinbecker's testimony in closing, in particular, his 
anti-social personality label, and his opinion that such behavior 
would continue as reasons for imposing the death penalty (R. 2879). 
This issue, like that regarding the testimony of Officer Jorgensen, 
requires further exploration, an evidentiary hearing, and briefing. 
Finally, the testimony of Mr. Fuches raises concerns 
similar to that of Dr. Heinbecker. Mr. Fuches1 testimony had the 
impact of informing the jury that a life sentence does not 
necessarily mean life, that defendants are released in as little as 
twelve years, and that all defendants get a rehearing within eleven 
to thirty years (R. 2822-6). Again, this is the type of evidence 
which the prosecution, not the defense, attempts to put on in the 
penalty phase; this issue demands further investigation and 
analysis. Imposing the death penalty out of fear that the defendant 
will some day be released from prison if life is imposed is arguably 
an improper and irrelevant basis; yet, the defense placed that 
information and basis squarely before the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that this Court grant a 
rehearing on this issue and determine that the issue is prematurely 
before it or remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary 
hearing on issues related to Mr. Gardner's claims of ineffective 
- 8 -
assistance of counsel. 
Counsel certifies that this Petition for Rehearing is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^ > day of M,fifcJO<k~f 
1989. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
(on claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel) 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
If EDWARD K. BRASS, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 3> day of ty;U£j£- \( / 
1989. 
EDWARD'K. BRASS J7 
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XIV. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant cites four instances of behavior 
he characterizes as prosecutorial misconduct: 
(1) referring to defendant as "defendant 
Bishop"; (2) laughing during a presentation by 
defense counsel in the penalty phase; (3) 
stating in the penalty phase that Gardner had 
escaped from maximum security; and (4) 
reading from a report that was not received 
into evidence. The test by which we measure 
alleged misconduct was articulated in State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). We 
look to see if the actions or remarks of 
counsel call to the attention of the jury a 
matter it would not be justified in considering 
in determining its verdict and, if so, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, whether 
"the error is substantial and prejudicial such 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence, there would have been a more favo-
rable result for the defendant." 
In the first instance alleged, the prosecution 
called defendant by the wrong name. Even 
though the name was that of another defen-
dant of some notoriety,4 it was not prejudicial. 
The reference, taken in context, was inadver-
tent, was immediately corrected, and did not 
interrupt the flow of the proceedings or focus 
the jury's attention on an improper basis for 
the verdict. 
Defendant's second allegation is that the 
prosecuting attorney laughed during present-
ation of a portion of defense counsel's argu-
ment in the penalty phase. While we cannot 
condone such actions, we accept the State's 
explanation that the prosecutor was merely 
reacting to defendant's counsel, who had 
removed exhibits the State had placed before 
the jury. The trial judge promptly admonished 
the prosecutor and determined that his action 
was neither significant nor prejudicial. Where 
there is no abuse of discretion, such a decision 
by the trial judge will not be reversed on 
appeal. See State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 
513 P.2d at 426. Our review of the record 
reveals nothing that would indicate that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying a 
mistrial on this point. 
Neither of the last claimed instances was 
improper. The reference to Gardner's escape 
from maximum security was a matter of int-
erpretation. He was being held in "maximum 
security" at the time of his escapes, both in 
1984 and in 1985, even though he was outside 
the confines of the maximum security unit of 
the prison when the escapes occurred. This 
fact was made clear to the jury; therefore, the 
remark did not misrepresent the facts or focus 
the jury's attention on an improper basis for 
its decision. Likewise, the portion of the 
medical report referred to by the prosecution 
had been read into the record; therefore, even 
though the written report had not been rece-
ived in evidence, the prosecution was arguing 
from evidence in the record. We find no basis 
on which to reverse the judgment or sentence 
based on prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant 
makes other claims, but because there is no 
record of the facts from which they arise, we 
cannot reach them. 
XV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant, in supplemental briefing, raises 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Specifically, he points out counsel's failure to 
object to the testimony of Officer Jorgensen, 
Dr. Heinbecker, and Mr. Fuchs. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 
698, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 
3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court set forth a two-part 
test to be used in examining claims based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The defen-
dant must show, first, specific acts or omiss-
ions which fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance and, 
second, that a reasonable probability exists 
that but for counsel's error, the result would 
have been different. State v. Pursifell, 746 
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 
2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699). In State v. Speer, 
750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988), we adopted 
the approach suggested in Strickland that "[i]f 
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, ... that course should be followed." 
See also Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 275. 
Here, we need not determine whether 
counsel's claimed shortfalls meet the first 
prong of the test. The failure to object to the 
testimony of Officer Jorgensen, as discussed in 
section VIII, infra, did not prejudice defen-
dant. Even if his counsel had raised the obje-
ction and had been successful in showing a 
violation of Miranda, the evidence was still 
admissible for the purpose for which it was 
offered; therefore, no prejudice resulted from 
the lack of an objection to this point. Dr. 
Heinbecker, a forensic psychiatrist, testified 
on defendant's behalf as to possible sources 
of defendant's behavior, such as genetics, 
environment, and possible brain damage. Mr. 
Fuchs was a member of the Board of Pardons 
and was called by the defense to testify gene-
rally as to the Board's role in reviewing sent-
ences and determining parole dates. Defendant 
does not identify any instance where his 
counsel failed to object to any questions asked 
during cross-examination of either witness. 
Our review of the record does not show 
conduct of counsel during the testimony of 
either witness which was lacking in any aspect 
of effective assistance. Having carefully revi-
ewed the transcript and proceedings below and 
the briefs on appeal, we are convinced that 
there was no prejudice to defendant in these 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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regards. Defendant makes other allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, no 
record was made on which we can review 
them. 
XVI. Cumulative Error 
Having fully reviewed the extensive record 
in this case, we are convinced that defendant's 
constitutional rights were cautiously guarded 
at all phases of the proceeding and that, 
overall, the trial was conducted in the fair and 
dignified fashion a capital case deserves. We 
reject defendant's assertions that the cumul-
ative effect of the alleged irregularities discu-
ssed above denied him a fair trial. 
Defendant's convictions and sentences, 
including the sentence of death for the first 
degree murder conviction, are affirmed. 
I CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
1. AH statutes cited are to Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). 
2. We also note, as we stated in State v. Gallegos, 
16 Utah 2d 102, 104-05, 396 P.2d 414, 415-16 
(1964), and State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 58, 513 
P.2d 422, 424 (1973), that generally an error in a 
manslaughter instruction where the jury finds an 
intentional killing is not prejudicial. State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d at 472 (Durham, J., concurring). 
3. In State v„ Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 
1988), we held that evidence of other violent crimes 
which have not resulted in convictions is admissible 
as aggravation of the penalty, subject to a finding 
by the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
the defendant's guilt of those other crimes. 
4. Preceding this trial, Arthur Gary Bishop was tried 
for the murders of several young boys. His trial and 
conviction received prominent coverage in the local 
media. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1988). 
STEWART, Justice: (Concurring) 
I concur in the majority opinion. However, 
because today's opinion might otherwise be 
taken as casting doubt on the position of a 
majority of the Court on one important point, 
I append these comments. The majority holds 
that it is not necessary to reach the issue of 
the admissibility of prior crime evidence used 
to prove a capital homicide aggravating factor 
under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(l)(h) 
because the admission of that evidence was at 
most harmless error. That ruling is a sufficient 
disposition of the issue here. 
Nevertheless, it is especially important in a 
capital case to make the law as clear as poss-
ible so as to avoid unnecessary error in the 
future. For that reason, I think it appropriate 
to state my concurrence with Justice Zimme-
rman's opinion in this case which holds that 
evidence of other crimes used to prove an 
aggravating circumstance under §76-5-
202(1 )(h) must be proved after a jury has first 




In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 489 (Utah 
1988), I joined Justice Zimmerman's concur-
ring opinion that expressed a similar view in a 
somewhat different legal context. Nevertheless, 
I expressly refrained from joining that opinion 
insofar as it was based on constitutional 
grounds. Again, I decline to adopt a constit-
utional basis for the rule. 
The courts historically have had inherent 
supervisory power over the order of adducing 
evidence in a case. Reliance on that power in 
this case is preferable since it is ordinarily 
better to avoid a constitutional ruling when 
there is another basis for decision. Constitut-
ionalization of the rule requiring bifurcation 
could lead to a degree of rigidity in evidentiary 
matters that could have untoward conseque-
nces. Evidence of prior crimes may be appr-
opriate or necessary in the guilt phaise of the 
trial for a variety of reasons. Such evidence 
may be admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) to 
prove motive, intent, identity, and other 
material issues under certain circumstances. See, 
e.g., State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 
(Utah 1982). There may even be instances 
when a defendant chooses to adduce prior 
crime evidence, for example, to establish an 
alibi by showing that he was incarcerated at 
the time of an alleged crime. In addition, the 
Legislature has in a number of instances made 
prior crimes elements of other substantive 
crimes. Constitutionalization of the rule might 
affect the use of prior crimes in unanticipated 
ways. The net effect of all this is that exclu-
sion of evidence of prior crimes as aggravating 
circumstances on due process grounds could 
have far-reaching ramifications that I am not 
prepared to confront. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring) 
I join in the majority opinion. However, I 
write separately to point out that the trial 
court erred in admitting evidence of Gardner's 
prior convictions before the jury had determ-
ined whether Gardner was guilty of a knowing 
or intentional homicide.1 See State v. James, 
99 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 18-19 (Jan. 6, 1989); 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 494-99 (Utah 
1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined by 
Stewart and Durham, J.J.). The bifurcated 
guilt phase procedure that a majority of the 
Court* said was required in Bishop and that we 
unanimously imposed in James should have 
been followed in the present case. See James, 
99 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-19; c/1 State v. 
Payton, 361 So. 2d 866, 870-74 (La. 1978) 
(holding that prior convictions may not be 
introduced in the guilt phase of a murder trial 
and that they may therefore not serve as ele-
ments of the crime of first degree murder but 
must be limited to introduction in tthe penalty 
phase as aggravating circumstances justifying 
imposition of the death penalty). 
NCE REPORTS 
Gardner 
Wv. Rep. 3 
